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LAW AND ITS LIMITATION IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM. By Olivier Long. Hingham, MA: Martinus Nijhoff,
1986, 158 pp., $38.50.
In early February of 1987, The "Uruguay Round" of multilateral
trade negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") began in earnest.
Olivier Long authors this thorough outline of the functioning
GATT system drawn from a series of lectures delivered at the prestigi-
ous Hague Academy of International Law. Mr. Long, a former Direc-
tor-General of the GATT, is currently a professor at the Graduate In-
stitute of International Studies in Geneva. His expertise in the subject
matter is attested to by his clear and concise description of an intricate
and complicated subject matter which often proves baffling to the un-
initiated. Indeed, during the Senate Hearings in 1951, Senator Milliken
is quoted as saying "Anyone who reads GATT is likely to have his
sanity impaired." However, drawing on his twelve years experience as
Director-General, Mr. Long has been able to present this complicated
material in a manner so as to make the GATT accessible to readers of
all backgrounds.
The book's introduction briefly discusses the history leading up to
the GATT's inception describing the world trade turmoil which re-
sulted from the "protectionism and the bilateralism of the Great De-
pression of the 1930's, the Second World War,"' and the failure of the
Havana Charter's proposed International Trade Organization. The in-
troduction goes on to present a subject which proves to be the book's
theme - the strange marriage between law and international politics
which is represented by the GATT.
The opening chapter deals with the legal framework of the GATT.
Here, Long sets out the five fundamental principles and rules which
comprise the organization's legal backbone: (1) Most Favored Nation
Treatment - which provides that every importation privilege granted
by a Contracting Party to any country shall similarly be granted to all
other Contracting Parties; (2) National Treatment - which dictates
that products imported from one member country to another shall be
treated in the same manner as domestic products with regard to inter-
nal taxation and regulations; (3) General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions - which proposes that GATT members are not to apply
quantitative limits on imports from other member nations; (4) Customs
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Duties as a Means of Protection - which states that while customs
duties are the only form of protection sanctioned by the GATT, contin-
ued reduction of these tariffs remains an objective of the organization;
and (5) Reciprocity -which declares that the Contracting Parties
shall work together on an equal footing toward the goal of free trade.
As he introduces these fundamental legal principles of GATT,
Long consistently points out the various exceptions to each rule, again
harkening back to the book's underlying theme; while formal rules are
necessary in an organization dedicated to the creation and preservation
of liberalized world trade, the political pressures which confront each
of the sovereign member nations dictate that the rules be relaxed under
certain conditions. As Long aptly puts it "had the GATT law remained
immutable, it would certainly have lost most of its authority. The adap-
tations and modifications that have been made should not be looked
upon as evidence of weakness but rather as an indication of the viabil-
ity of the system and of a willingness to change." 2
The second chapter discusses the GATT's role in promoting nego-
tiation among the member nations and the interrelationship between
such negotiations and the GATT's legal principles. In this section Long
examines the various rounds of multilateral negotiations (the present
Uruguay Round is the eighth in the series). Citing specific examples of
progress made during the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, Long demon-
strates the value of these meetings. According to Long:
Experience has shown that, for political, psychological and practi-
cal reasons, the occasion of an extensive trade negotiation creates
the right environment for the conclusion of new instruments dealing
with the difficult, and sometimes contentious areas of trade rela-
tions. Advantage can be taken of the momentum that is generated;
the administrative infrastructure set up when negotiations take
place and in capitals; the existence of precise terminal dates; and
the fact that several areas are concurrently under negotiation with
the aim of achieving an overall balance in final settlement. 3
Long illustrates his assertion through a "laundry list" of some of
the many accomplishments of these negotiation sessions: the Anti-
dumping code, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties,
the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, the Agreement on
Government Procurement, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id. at 26.
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Trade, the agreements to provide preferential treatment to developing
nations, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and procedures providing for the
accession to GATT by market-economy industrialized countries, devel-
oping countries and countries with centrally planned economies. The
successes of these rounds demonstrate both the value of the GATT and
the wisdom of permitting the organization to change as dictated by
world political developments. Indeed, "International trade, by its na-
ture, is dynamic and evolutive. It is, therefore, not easily amenable to
the rules and procedures of a legal framework unless the framework
itself remains flexible and in evolution." 4
In the third chapter, Long discusses the GATT as it functions. All
true power in the GATT is derived from the Contracting Parties them-
selves. Through the years the Contracting Parties have chosen to dele-
gate certain tasks to various councils and committee systems. The
Council of Representatives is the intercessional body and executive or-
gan of the Contracting Parties. It oversees the day to day business of
the organization. In addition, the GATT, from time to time, sets up
committees and panels to examine issues of interest to the member na-
tions. A consultative group of eighteen member nations has also been
formed to help implement the GATT's policies in a more economical
fashion than would be possible if consultation with all the Contracting
Parties was necessary on every issue. Long goes on to describe the posi-
tion of Director-General, a position with which he is intimately famil-
iar. The Director-General is an initiator of action, a mediator of con-
flicts and the manager of the GATT's affairs. Although he has no
formal mandatory authority, through his prestige and powers of per-
suasion he is able to wield considerable power.
In the latter part of the chapter, Long discusses the GATT's safe-
guard clause. Often referred to as the "escape clause," this key provi-
sion of the GATT authorizes a member nation to take protective mea-
sures when imports of certain products threaten serious injury to
domestic producers. According to Long, the safeguard clause, "repre-
sents a link between two contradictory objectives: one is the respect by
governments for commitments on trade liberalization, and the other is
their concern to keep a margin of manoeuvre enabling them, if the eco-
nomic situation makes it necessary, to protect the domestic market
through the imposition of restrictive measures."5 The GATT must con-
tinually walk the tightrope between these two contradictory objectives
and the safeguard clause is demonstrative of the GATT's pragmatic
4. Id. at 24.
5. Id. at 57.
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approach to this dilemma. As Long emphasizes once again, "If the
GATT had been administered in an inflexible manner if it had proved
impervious to change, it would have gradually lost its influence on
trade policies. The GATT has maintained its strength by pursuing its
goals realistically."'
Chapter Four is concerned with supervision of the GATT and the
operation of the General Agreement. The GATT provides no recourse
to a judicial body, yet it must maintain a reasonable degree of compli-
ance while still providing a method for the settlement of disputes.
Often the GATT relies on "moral pressure" to restrain a member na-
tion from acting contrary to the principles of the GATT. Indeed, this
method proved sufficient to persuade the United States to drop a 10%
surcharge which was briefly implemented in 1971. This experience il-
lustrates that the fear of losing the advantage of tariff concessions and
other GATT benefits can, in and of itself, prevent disputes.
Rather than settle disputes, the GATT has frequently been able to
avoid the creation of potential problems. Long offers two examples
here: trade in agriculture and the creation of customs unions and free
trade areas. "Agriculture trade has been virtually excluded and insu-
lated from the process of trade liberalization . . . .Agriculture is
treated differently in the GATT for reasons that have nothing to do
with the law but which are dictated by domestic political constraints."'7
As these quotations indicate, agriculture is such a politically sensitive
issue to many of the member nations that the GATT has expressly
excepted agricultural trade from many of its provisions.
The creation of the European Economic Community also repre-
sented a potential threat to the viability of the GATT. For the most
part however, problems were avoided through the GATT exceptions for
customs unions and free trade areas. While these exceptions run con-
trary to the GATT's principles of Most Favored Nation Treatment and
Reciprocity, Long argues persuasively that "the discriminatory effects
of customs unions, free trade areas and the like have been progressively
eroded by the big reductions in customs duties resulting from the
GATT 'rounds of negotiations.'"8 Agricultural trade and customs un-
ions are further examples of how the GATT has been able to adapt to
the political climate and remain an effective organization.
The primary objective of the GATT's dispute settlement procedure
is to promote an agreement which is mutually acceptable to the disput-
6. Id. at 62.
7. Id. at 68-9.
8. Id. at 70.
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ing parties. A panel will generally monitor bilateral negotiations and, if
no agreement is reached, the panel will submit its findings and recom-
mendations to the Council. The Council then adopts (no panel report
has been rejected) the panel's findings and gives them legal force. If
the recommendations are not complied with, the GATT provides for
recourse through retaliatory measures. In practice, retaliation has
rarely been sought and occurred only once in a dispute involving dairy
products brought by the Netherlands against the United States. The
paucity of cases in which retaliation was sought indicates an underlying
strength in the overall organization.
The fifth and final chapter deals with the GATT's system of pref-
erences which were adopted to promote the interests of developing
countries. While the concept of granting preferential treatment runs
contrary to the fundamental GATT principles of Most Favored Nation
Treatment and Reciprocity, the member nations saw a need to take
positive action to facilitate economic expansion in the smaller and
weaker countries. Long quotes former UNCTAD Secretary General,
Raul Prebisch, who expressed these sentiments when he said: "However
valid the MFN principle may be in regulating trade relations among
equals, it is not a suitable concept for trade involving countries of
vastly unequal economic strength."' The member nations accomplished
this goal initially by permitting "donor" Contracting Parties to waive
Most Favored Nation Treatment and by relieving their commitment on
reciprocity in order to allow these Contracting Parties to participate
with impunity in the Generalized Systems of Preferences. Later the
GATT enacted the "enabling clause" which established a permanent
legal basis for preferences in favor of developing countries. Thus, the
GATT was once again able to adapt itself in accordance with the
desires of the world trading community.
Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System,
by Olivier Long is an authoritative work on a subject of great impor-
tance. A reading of the book is particularly recommended to those who
wish to follow the progress at the "Uruguay Round" as the Contracting
Parties wrestle with such contentious issues as the rules on agricultural
trade, investment, the nontariff barrier codes, intellectual property
rights, and trade in services. The theme of Long's book is that the
GATT, even though it is a system of laws, must always remain cogni-
zant of the political pressures that confront the member nations. The
current situation in the United States with its 170 billion dollar trade
deficit and the resulting calls to arms in the Congress and the nation at
9. Id. at 90.
1987]
132 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 11
large provides a perfect example of just how intense the political pres-
sures can become. If the precedent described by Long is followed, "this
too shall pass" and the GATT, perhaps with minor adjustments, shall
remain intact.
Brian V. Kennedy*
* J.D., University of Virginia; Associate, Ablondi & Foster, P.C., Washington,
D.C.
